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if the well is a dry hole, then the loss must fall on the parties to the venture
as a calculated business risk. In light of economic realities and the ultimate
goal of development, Oklahoma courts should not unduly penalize the prudent operator.
If an informed attorney is involved at the initial stages of a proposed drilling operation, many of the problems outlined above may be avoided. Draftsmanship evident in many oil and gas leases now in use displays not only a
less than adequate working knowledge of basic oil and gas law but a certain
degree of irresponsibility toward the business risks associated with oil and
gas ventures. An attorney who utilizes the barest minimum of "saving" clauses
is asking for almost certain litigation and financial misfortune for his client.
The use of an expansive saving clause that allows operations past the primary
term in anticipation of uncertainties that arise in the oil and gas industry will
better accomplish the ultimate goal of development, the production of oil
and gas.
Raymond J. Kane

Oil and Gas: The Implied Covenant for Further
Exploration-Does It Exist in Oklahoma?
In 1956 a new theory was proposed involving implied covenants in the field
of oil and gas law. This new theory was identified as the implied covenant
of further exploration.' This proposed covenant has caused substantial controversy among many writers and courts as to whether it should bo recognized
as a separate covenant, distinct from the implied covenant of further development. Opinions have been written about this new covenant approving it, 2 rejecting it,3 and finding no need for it because the existing covenant of further
development is said to encompass all situations adequately." This proposed
covenant has caused the area involving implied covenants to be scrutinized
5
more closely than ever before.
1. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEX. L. REv. 553 (1956)

[hereinafter cited as Meyers].
2. See Meyers, supra note 1; E. KuNTz,

OIL AND GAS

§

62.1; R. HEMINGWAY, OIL

AND

GAS § 8.3 (1971).

3. See Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of FurtherExploration: Reply to Comment,
37 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1959); Brown, The Implied Covenant for Additional Development, 13
Sw. L.J. 149 (1959); Merrill, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 4 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 205 (1958).
4. See Galvin, Meyers v. Brown-Jurisprudencein Action, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 589 (1960);
Merrill, The Implied Covenant of FurtherExploration, 4 ROCKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 205 (1958);
Merrill, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration in Oklahoma, 13 OKLA. L. REv. 249

(1960).

5. Merrill, The Implied Covenant for FurtherExploration, 4
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A recent Oklahoma case, Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.,6 has determined
that the implied covenant to further explore does not exist separately from
the covenant to further develop. This conclusion seems to be in direct conflict with prior Oklahoma case law that indicates it does exist, although the
courts 7may not have used the specific term of "further exploration" to identify it.
The intent of this note is to analyze the Oklahoma cases to determine if,
in fact, Oklahoma courts recognize a covenant of further exploration separately
from the covenant of further development, and to determine the appropriate
standard for its application.
Analysis of the Covenants for Further
Exploration and FurtherDevelopment
To understand the implied covenant for further exploration as discussed
in this note, it is necessary to distinguish between the duty to explore and
the duty to develop. The duty to develop is concerned with additional drilling
in known producing formations, while the duty for further exploration is concerned with additional drilling in potentially productive strata that are as yet
unproved.'
The implied covenant of further development is intended to prevent delays
in recovering oil and gas in place. Because the development of the leasehold
is the main consideration for the granting of a lease, maximum development
is required to further the original purpose of the parties. Failure to develop
the leasehold deprives the lessor of royalties and prevents him from procuring
further development himself. Delay in development may result in drainage
of adjoining lands as the remainder of the field is fully developed and depleted. 9
The covenant for further exploration differs from the covenant for further
development, both in the reasons given for it and in the harm it seeks to
avoid. The covenant for further exploration was suggested by Professor Meyers
in 1956."1 He suggests it should apply to situations where lessors demand additional drilling in unproved strata. An example of when the covenant would
205, 244 (1958), wherein Professor Merrill states: "Professor Meyers has made a challenging
and stimulating suggestion for dealing with a most puzzling set of decisions. We all owe him
a debt of gratitude for making us think the whole subject through once more."
6. 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
7. See Sauder v. Mid-Continent Pet. Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934); Magnolia Pet. Co. v.
Wilson, 215 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1954); Trust Co. of Chicago v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d
282 (10th Cir. 1951); Crocker v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 419 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1965); Producer's
Pipe & Supply Co. v. James, 332 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1958); Neff v. Jones, 288 P.2d 712 (Okla.
1955); Sand Springs Home v. Clemens, 276 P.2d 262 (Okla. 1954); Colpitt v. Tull, 204 Okla.
289, 228 P.2d 1000 (1950); McKenna v. Nichlos, 193 Okla. 526, 145 P.2d 957 (1944); Doss Oil
Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
8. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 831 (1982). See also Chenowith v. Pan
American Pet. Corp., 314 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1964); E. KtmTZ, OIL AND GAS § 58.1 (1978);
R. HEMONGWAY, OL AND GAS § 8.3 (1971).
9. E. KUNTZ, OIL AND GA § 58.1, at 61.
10. Meyers, supra note 1.
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be applicable is as follows: Suppose an oil and gas lease is executed on 1,280
acres of land for a primary term of five years. The lessee drills and obtains
a commercial gas well at 4,500 feet in the third year of the primary term.
Ten years later, other operators conduct drilling at greater depths in the general
vicinity and discover a productive formation. Thereafter, the lessor demands
deeper test wells on his land but the lessee refuses, stating that further drilling
is unwarranted at that time. Twelve years later, the lessor sues to cancel the
lease, except for the 160 acres surrounding the producing gas well. Experts
testify that there is a fair chance of discovering oil at greater depths but that
any well drilled would be a wildcat. One operator testifies that he would be
willing to drill a test well on the lessor's land if he could obtain a lease. "'
The question is whether the lessor should be able to cancel the lease under
these circumstances.
The covenant for further exploration may also apply to further exploration
in the horizontal plane. Suppose in the above example that a well is drilled
in the northeast corner of the 1,280 acres and the lessor seeks drilling in the
southwest portion of the land to the same producing horizon. The lessee refuses
because he thinks the risk is too great.' 2 Again, the question is whether the
lessor should be allowed cancellation of the lease.
A definition of the breach of the covenant of further exploration has been
summarized as follows:
[T]o establish breach of the covenant of further exploration, the
lessor must show that under the circumstances the failure to drill
exploratory wells in search of a new producing formation is
unreasonable. Among the circumstances relevant to the inquiry are:
(1) the period of time that has elapsed since the well was drilled;
(2) the size of the. tract and the number and location of existing
wells in relation thereto; (3) the existence on the land of untested
geological formations favorable to the accumulation of hydrocarbon substances; (4) the attitude of the lessee toward further testing
of the land, and his operations on the land and elsewhere in the
vicinity in this regard; (5) the feasibility of further exploratory drilling, including the cost of drilling, the market for the product, and
the size of the block needed to justify a test well; (6) whether part
of the leasehold is excluded from a production unit, so that the

11. H.

WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 842, at 264-65 (1982).
12. Id. at 265 n.3. See also example given in Meyers, supra note 1, at 555:
A rancher executed a lease on 640 acres of land in 1930. In 1932, oil production
was obtained in the northeast quarter-section. Four wells were drilled, the first
three were producers and the fourth, in the southwest quarter of the quarter-section,
a dry hole. No other wells were drilled. In 1956 production totals sixty barrels
daily from all three wells. But in 1955 another and deeper producing formation
was discovered by a well located two miles to the southwest of the southern boundary
of the lease. The rancher demands further exploratory drilling on his land. Should
he get it?
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lease is being preserved thereon without the payment of royalty
for such acreage or the conducting of operations thereon."
The reasons given for this covenant are derived from the two main objectives the lessor seeks by granting the oil and gas lease: the testing and the
developing of all portions of the leased premises.' 4 If the lessee fails either
to develop fully all portions of the leased premises, or to explore all portions
of it, the essential purpose for which the lease was granted ceases to exist,
and the lease should be subject to cancellation as to the unexplored portions
of it.
The harm in exploration cases is also different from that in the development cases. In the exploration cases, the harm to the lessor is the lack of
further exploration on the lessor's land that could result in monetary losses,
especially if there is another operator willing to explore by drilling if he
could acquire the lease. The harm to the lessor in a development case is the
deprivation of royalties and a denial of the opportunity to have the land
further developed.
Analysis of the Standards To Be Applied
If the implied covenant for further exploration is adopted, it will be necessary
to formulate an appropriate standard for evaluating the operator's performance.
The ultimate question involved in this controversy is whether the standard of the reasonably prudent operator that applies to the covenant of further
development is to be applied in further exploration cases. The rule has been
well defined as follows: "[T]he lessor, in order to prove a breach of the covenant to drill additional wells, must show that the additional well would probably produce sufficient amounts to repay the expense of drilling, equipping
and operating such well and also produce a reasonable profit on the entire
outlay.""
Since the implied covenant for further development contemplates drilling
in proved formations, the reasonably prudent operator rule is the appropriate
standard. This rule incorporates the requirements for demand and notice prior
to cancellation and gives the lessee an opportunity to commence further drilling. If he can show that further development would be unprofitable, the
leasehold will not be canceled. The lessor presumably is not harmed because
no prudent operator would drill even if the lessor could give him a lease.
In these lease cancellation cases, drainage is always an appropriate consideration in discussing offset wells, and substantial drainage indicates that another
well would be profitable.
The prudent operator rule is inappropriate for the implied covenant for
further exploration mainly because the covenant contemplates drilling in unproved formations. If the prudent operator rule is strictly applied to explora13. H.

WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 841, at 259-60 (1982).
14. Producer's Pipe & Supply Co. v. James, 332 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1958).
15. Ramsey Pet. Corp. v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 158, 85 P.2d 427, 430 (1938).
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tion situations, the lessor would be required to prove the probable profitability
of the requested additional well. Since the covenant for further exploration
contemplates drilling in unproved formations, it would be next to impossible
for the lessor to prove this probable profit. Consequently the lessor would
not be entitled to the exploratory well in any circumstance. It has been argued
that if the lessor does not have the burden of showing that additional drilling
would be profitable to the lessee, this would defeat the purposes and intent
of the contracting parties in an oil and gas lease.' 6 This is not true. If the
lessee holding a large tract of land under an oil and gas lease has developed
only a small portion of it and an unreasonable length of time has passed
since the last drilling, the lessee presumably is not harmed because he was
not going to drill additional wells anyway. He may be losing the right to hold
the larger tract for purely speculative purposes, but such speculation is expressly forbidden by case law.' 7
The intent behind an oil and gas lease was stated as follows in Fox Petroleum
Co. v. Booker'8 :
The principle, as we understand it, is that development of every
part of the lease is an implied condition. Therefore, whether the
undeveloped portion be a single tract remote from the rest, or a
considerable portion of a very large tract, or a deeper stratum,
the existence of which may be doubtful, or the east one hundred
acres of a tract of 160, it is an implied condition that the lessee
will test every part. When he abandons all further testing and
disclaims any obligation to test, he may be required likewise to
surrender all claim to the property.'
This definition implicitly incorporates the duty for further exploration
without the prudent operator test. It seems reasonable that the prudent operator
rule not be strictly applied, if it is to be applied at all. If the rule is rigidly
applied, the result will invariably favor the lessee, and the lessor will be harmed
because he cannot procure any further testing of the remainder of the leasehold.
If another standard is used and the lease is canceled as to the unproved formations, the lessee is not harmed because he was not planning to test those formations anyway.
One court has stated that the prudent operator rule is to be used as a
"measuring stick" and that it should be flexible, adjusting to the circumstances
of each case.2 0 In applying this new, flexible standard, the courts should require that a demand be made of the lessee, giving him a chance to drill another
well to avoid cancellation of the lease. The only factor this new standard should
not require is that the lessor prove that the additional well would be pro-

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Producer's Pipe & Supply Co. v. James,
Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192
Fox Pet. Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276,
Id. at 282, 253 P.2d at 38.
Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192

332 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1958).
Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
253 P. 33 (1976).
Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934, 938 (1943).
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fitable to the lessee. Other factors involved are the length of time that has
passed since the completion of the last well, the size of the tract involved,
and the number and locations of wells that have already been completed. The
lessee could still prevail, however, if he shows definite proof that the drilling
would be unprofitable. This, in effect, shifts the burden of proof of profitability from the lessor to the lessee when the lessor initially shows an
unreasonable length of time since the last drilling.
With this in mind, it appears it would be beneficial to have the courts adopt
a new standard of application along with the covenant of further exploration
as a separate and distinct covenant from that of further development. An
attempt to keep all factual situations under the prudent operator rule would
be to take a well-settled rule of law and stretch it beyond recognition, or
to allow the exceptions to swallow the rule entirely. As a result, there will
be a greater number of litigated cases than in the past because no one can
be sure how a particular court will construe the prudent operator rule under
a given set of facts.
Oklahoma Authority for the Covenant of Further Exploration
In the recent case of Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.," the Oklahoma
Supreme Court expressly held: "[Tihere is no implied covenant to further
as distinguished from the imexplore after paying production is obtained,
22
plied covenant to further develop."
This note questions the conclusion reached by the supreme court in light
of the past Oklahoma decisions in this area of law. An analysis of the cases
that seem to indicate there is, or should be, a separate-covenant will be compared with the analysis of Mitchell.
Although the cases to be discussed do not use the express terms of "covenant of further exploration," there is no doubt that the court has recognized that there is a difference between the two covenants. This is shown by
the fact that the court does not require the lessor to prove probable profitability in all the cases, which is usually the essential element under the prudent operator rule.
The first case to discuss this covenant is Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker.23
In Fox the court came very close to expressly recognizing the covenant of
further exploration.24 The lessee held a lease consisting of 60 acres. When
21.
22.
23.
24.

638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
Id. at 449.
123 Okla. 276, 253 P. 33 (1926).
Id. at 281, 253 P.2d at 37:
And if the obligation of the lessees be viewed as one for exploration rather
than development (and so, perhaps, not affected by the possibility of financial return),
the evidence still fails to establish want of reasonable diligence in exploration. When
this suit was filed some six months had elapsed since the completion of the last
well. Under the facts and circumstances presented by this record, considering the
fact that the wells already drilled on the 60 acres were to a certain extent an exploration of the entire tract, it does not appear that the delay was unreasonable.
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the suit was filed, six months had elapsed since the completion of the last
well. The court was concerned with the strong policy against allowing the
lessee to hold a productive lease for speculation purposes, but held that the
lease would stay in effect because there was not an unreasonable delay in
drilling, and the lessor did not make any demands upon the lessee for an
2
additional well. Although Fox relied on an abandonment theory, this theory was stricken
in Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co.2 6 In Dossthe court rejected the abandonment theory and turned to the theory of breach of covenant, without the requirement that the lessor show probable profitability. The suit for cancellation was brought for the undeveloped portions of two leases. No wells had
been drilled for fourteen years, and the lessor's demand to the lessee to drill
was refused. The lessor then sued under the theory of abandonment. The
court rejected this theory, stating that it was a legal fiction used to arrive
at an equitable result and that the true basis of the decision was cancellation
for breach of covenant.27 The ultimate question the court raised was whether
the courts should grant relief without requiring the lessor to prove that the
additional wells could be 2drilled
with a reasonable expectation of profit and,
"
if so, upon what theory.
In answering this question, the court pointed out:
The important fact, regardless of theory, is that the defendant
had, at the commencement of this action, held substantial
undeveloped portions of these leases for over fourteen years without
drilling a single well thereon. Defendant contends that it is entitled
to hold the whole of both leases because it has production on other
parts of the leases and that further development is not required
under the implied covenants because circumstances have not indicated that development would be profitable. If defendant's theory
is correct, it may hold the land without further development as
long as production from the present wells continues in paying quantities, regardless of how long that may be. The courts and text
writers condemn such attempts of lessees to so indefinitely freeze
the undeveloped portions of oil and gas leases, hold them for
speculative purposes and thus prevent the owners from getting full
29
development of their land.
The court, holding that the lessor may have cancellation of the unused
portions of the lease without proof that the additional drilling would be
profitable to the lessee, explained how the prudent operator rule operates in
these circumstances.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Six months had elapsed since the last drilling.
192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
Id. at 363, 137 P.2d at 938.
Id. at 361, 137 P.2d at 936.
Id.
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The prudent operator rule may be considered as a measuring stick
to guide the court in determining the diligence required of the lessee
in order to ascertain whether a breach of the implied covenant has
occurred. Like other rules of equity, the prudent operator rule is
not inflexible. The statement that the implied covenant for further
operations is limited to cases where there is a likelihood of profit
to the lessee must be taken in a restricted sense and is not of universal application. It will depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. The broad rule as to burden of proof.., is
not to be applied after the lapse of an unreasonable length of time."0
Although the court spoke in terms of the implied covenant to further develop,
it apparently recognized that the covenant it applied is substantially different
from the covenant of further development, the difference being the standard
that is applied with regard to the profitability requirement.
In a decision following Doss, the court faced the question of whether a
lease should be canceled as to deeper formations the lessees had failed to explore. The lease in McKenna v. Nichlos3' was executed in 1917 with a primary
term of five years. The lease covered two tracts of land and two wells were
drilled on the south 40 acres to the Fortuna sand (2,400'). No other wells
were drilled. Twenty-three years after the execution of the lease, the lessor
brought suit to cancel the lease. The lessee testified that the Fortuna sand
under the lease was exhausted and offered to assign the lease to the plaintiff
insofar as the Fortuna sand was concerned. The evidence showed the field
was not a proved field, and a well drilled to deeper sands would be purely
exploratory. The lessee testified that he intended to drill to deeper sands
"whenever conditions justified it," but that conditions would not justify such
a well until there was a better market for gas and oil and more certainty of
production from deeper sands. 32
There was no evidence indicating that a prudent operator would undertake
the drilling of such a well with a reasonable expectation of profit. The trial
court canceled the lease to the Fortuna sand and all sands above it but left
the lease in effect as to deeper sands. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court remanded the case with instructions to grant the defendant sixty days
within which to commence a well to the deeper formations and, if the drilling
was not commenced within that time, the lease would be canceled as to all
formations. The court stated:*
IT]he duty to drill further wells, after the lapse of an unreasonable
length of time, is not tested by the standard of the prudent operator
alone. .

.

. [W]e would also give weight to other considerations,

particularly the length of time which the lessee had held the lease
without further development. In other words after the passage of
30. Id. at 363, 137 P.2d at 938.
31. 193 Okla. 526, 145 P.2d 957 (1944).
32. Id. at 527, 145 P.2d at 957.
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a reasonable length of time the duty to drill additional wells becomes
progressively greater, and the standard of the prudent operator
becomes progressively of less importance in determining whether
such a duty exists."
McKenna makes it clear that the court was again recognizing a covenant
substantively different from the covenant of further development. If it were
not, why did the court explicitly state that there was no reasonable expectation of profit with regard to the deeper formations and then proceed conditionally to cancel the lease? This flexible prudent operator rule was imposed
not only to encourage the development of natural resources and to comply
with the intentions of the contracting parties, i.e., all of the lease premises
would be fully developed, but also to prevent speculation by the lessee.
Ten years after this decision, a decision was rendered showing another example of the Oklahoma rule. Sand Springs Home v. Clemens ' involved a
lease executed in 1938 on a 120-acre tract of land. A well was drilled on the
southwest 40 acres in 1938, and in 1939 a dry hole was drilled in the southeast
40 acres. Twelve years after the execution of the lease, the lessor sued for
cancellation of the lease for failure to develop and operate the lease diligently.
The lessee testified that because of the number of dry holes drilled in the
area no further development would be justified. Judgment was rendered for
the lessor, relying on Doss:
To permit the lessee to hold the lease for an unreasonable length
of time for merely speculative purposes is to allow him to protect
his own interest and to disregard the interest of the lessor. If conditions do not indicate to him that further development will be
profitable, it is but fair that, after a reasonable time has expired,
he surrender the undeveloped portions of the lease and allow the
lessor to procure development by others or assume the burden of
showing why in equity and good conscience the undeveloped portion should not be cancelled so that the owner may, if possible,
get it developed by others."
The court, in its summation stated:
That reasoning is particularly applicable to the situation in the case
33. Id. at 528-29, 145 P.2d at 960.
34. 276 P.2d 262 (Okla. 1954). See also Neff v. Jones, 288 P.2d 712.(Okla. 1955), where,
in the syllabus, the court states:
2. In a lessor's action to cancel the undeveloped portions of an oil and gas lease
on account of a breach of one or more of its covenants, the burden'generally rests
upon him to plead and prove sufficient facts to induce a reasonable conclusion
that such breach has occurred, but where, from the alleged facts, it may be thus
concluded that the lessee's alleged breach of the implied covenant for further development has continued for an unreasonable or unconscionable period, it is not necessary
for the lessor to plead and prove that a reasonably prudent operator would, under
the circumstances, undertake such development.
35. Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
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at bar. One small producing well was drilled on the entire 120 acre
tract over a period of some twelve years. The testimony in the
record can lead to but one conclusion, namely, that the defendant
because of one dry hole drilled by it and another drilled some twenty
years previously indicate that further development would prove unprofitable. If such be the case, no injury could result to defendant
by a cancellation of the lease as to the undeveloped portion of
the lands embraced therein. Equity and justice to the plaintiff re36
quire that it be done.
There was no mention of a requirement that the lessor show the probable
profitability of any additional wells.
Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.
At this point, it is appropriate to consider the recent Oklahoma decision
of Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.7 Mitchell expressly held that a covenant
to further explore does not exist separately from the covenant to further
38
develop.
.Mitchell involved a suit for cancellation and release of the 23-year-old oil
and gas leases held by the defendant lessees. The lessors alleged that exploration in the general area had established the presence of numerous potentially
productive formations that the defendants had failed to explore and that the
defendants were holding the lease through marginal production from one formation for speculation purposes only. The trial court granted conditional
cancellations of the lease on the theory of breach of the implied covenant
for further exploration. The supreme court reversed the judgment, stating that
no such covenant exists in Oklahoma. The court rationalized this by stating:
The machinery to adjudicate an "exploration" controversy exists
presently in the form of the covenant to diligently develop ...
It is simply not realistic to ignore profit as a consideration of the
standard of a prudent operator simply because the lessor demands
a wildcat be drilled on a productive
lease rather than an additional
9
formation.
productive
a
to
well
In view of the previous Oklahoma case law,' which holds that relief is not
dependent upon proof by the lessor that an additional well would be profitable, the supreme court's statement is obviously inconsistent.
In reaching this decision, the court attempted to distinguish the prior
Oklahoma cases granting cancellation without a showing of probable profitability and relied on the 1959 Texas case of Clifton v. Koontz."' Clifton disap36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Sand Springs Home v. Clemens, 276 P.2d 262, 263 (Okla. 1954).
638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 447.
See generally cases cited at note 7 supra.
325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
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proved of the existence of a covenant to further explore as being untenable
and "diametrically opposed to our established prudent operator rule where
expectation of profit is an essential element.' ' 2 While Mitchell relies on Clifton
for its authority, the court fails to recognize the prior Oklahoma cases that
recognize the covenant for further exploration. It should be noted that Clifton
did not involve the same facts as in other exploration-type cases. Clifton involved a lease executed in 1940 covering two tracts of land encompassing 350
acres. During the primary term, a well was drilled that produced both gas
and oil, but very little oil. It was classified as an associated (with oil) gas
well. The next operation on the land was seven years later when the lessee
successfully reworked the same well, this date of reworking being subsequent
to the filing of the case. The Texas Supreme Court recognized these different
facts and stated:
However it should be noted that we do not have a factual situation where the lease covers several thousand acres and an effort
is being made to hold such vast acreage by showing production
from a comparatively small area. Neither are we confronted with
a situation where an unreasonably long length of time has elapsed
premises. Therefore, we
since the last development of the leased
3
do not pass upon these questions.4
From this modifying language, it is uncertain what the Texas view will be
in a factual situation involving a true exploration case where the lessor has
requested further exploration of the same formation, is unable to show profitability, and the lessee has not engaged in development for an unreasonable
length of time or expressly refuses to explore further.
Mitchell also relies on Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.," the same
case Professor Meyers cites as the leading case recognizing his proposed covenant of further exploration. Sauder involved a lease on two tracts of lands,
one consisting of 320 acres and another of 40 acres. An oil and gas lease
was executed in 1916, and two wells were drilled on the 40-acre tract from
1920 to 1921. The lessor requested further exploration on the 320-acre tract,
and when it was refused, brought suit in 1930 for cancellation of the lease.
The lessee's defense was that the sands pinched out, making production highly
unlikely. The lessor did not show that the lessee could drill at a profit, but
the court ruled that the lease to the 320-acre tract would be canceled unless
development was begun within a reasonable time.
Although other cases have followed the Sauder rule,' 3 Mitchell distinguished

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 697.
Id. at 696.
292 U.S. 272 (1934).
Magnolia Pet. Co. v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1954); Trust Co. of Chicago v.

Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1951); Sand Springs Home v. Clemens, 276 P.2d
262 (Okla. 1954); McKenna v. Nichlos, 193 Okla. 526, 145 P.2d 957 (1944); Doss Oil Royalty
Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
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the holding in Sauder by attaching unwarranted meaning to the words in the
lease, emphasizing form over substance. One passage on which the court relied
states: "[T]he respondent ... had not ... explored and developed the lands

as required by the express and implied covenants of the lease." ' 46 The court
went on to state that: "The question for discussion is whether the respondent
failed to comply with an implied covenant to develop the tract with reasonable
diligence." ' 47 As noted in the above-cited cases, the fact that the court uses
the term "implied covenant of development" does not conclusively determine
that the court does not recognize something substantively different. The
ultimate issue involves what standard is to be applied to determine if the lessee
is in breach.
Obviously Mitchell is not in accord with previous Oklahoma decisions. The
court disregards prior contrary cases with minimal analysis of the holdings. 4
The cases that Mitchell does not discuss4 9 are of extreme importance and bear
directly on the statement by the court requiring proof of probable profitability of the additional wells.
Failure to recognize the profit motive as an instrumental force in
oil and gas leases on behalf of both lessor and lessee is to ignore
the very essence of the contract. It is unquestionable that both the
lessee and lessor intended to benefit monetarily from the produce
of the land through sale of its hydrocarbons."0
These "ignored" cases state that a showing of profitability is not required
in order for the lessor to receive relief. The court tries to avoid these cases
without explaining the rationale behind the avoidance. For example, in discussing Doss,' the court held the fact that the wells in the area were drilled
every two and one-half acres (the standard practice at that time) bears directly
on profitability and, therefore, "it cannot truly be said Doss stands as an exploration case or an action cancelling a lease without consideration of evidence
relating to the profitability of further drilling."152 As noted in the discussion
of Doss above, Doss specifically held that proof of profitability is not a prerequisite to cancellation of an oil and gas lease where there has been an
unreasonable delay in drilling additional wells. It can hardly be said that Doss
considered profitability proof by the lessor just because the lessor showed
that the practice at the time was to drill a well every two and one-half acres.

46. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 448 (Okla. 1981) (emphasis by the court).
47. Id. at 448.
48. Id., where the court states: "While these cases can be viewed as the proffered authority,
we decline to state that the issue of probable profitability is not a relevant consideration in an
action to cancel a lease for failure to further develop thus creating an action to cancel for failure
to further explore."
49. See Neff v. Jones, 288 P.2d 712 (Okla. 1955); Sand Springs Home v. Clemens, 276 P.2d
262 (Okla. 1954).
50. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 447 (Okla. 1981).
51. Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
52. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981).
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